IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
DELIVERED ON THE 16TH OF MAY, 2025
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU	**JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT**
TIJJANI ABUBUKAR	**JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT**
CHIDIEBERE NWAOMA UWA	**JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT**
HABEEB ADEWALE. O. ABIRU	**JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT**
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS	**JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT**

SC/796/2021

BETWEEN

Chief Solomon Owoniyi ..... **Appellant**

AND

Chief Henry Oluwole Aiyewumi
Chief Stephen Ojo Beleyi (for himself and on behalf of Ajibohokun Ruling House of Ilajo Ruling Family)
Raphael Aiyegunle (for himself and on behalf of Mokelu Ruling House of Ilajo Ruling Family)
Chief Olorunmola Oloruntoba (for himself and on behalf of Ajinuhi Ruling House of Ilajo Ruling Family)
Governor, Kogi State
Attorney General, Kogi State ..... **Respondents**

JUDGMENT
(DELIVERED BY HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, JSC)

This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Abuja Judicial Division, delivered on the 31st of March, 2021 in Appeal No CA/A/1116/2019, and which set aside the decision of the High Court of Kogi State contained in a Ruling delivered on the 10th of October, 2019 in Suit No HCL/67/2018. I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JSC. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved the

issues in contention in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide the conclusion that the appeal has no merit and should be dismissed.

The dispute leading up to this appeal revolved around the chieftaincy stool of Obaro of Kaaba and it arose from the appointment of the Appellant as the new Obaro of Kaaba and his approval and recognition as such by the fifth Respondent. The first to the fourth Respondents commenced the action in the High Court to challenge the appointment, approval and recognition of the Appellant as the Obaro of Kaaba and the Appellant, the fourth Respondent and the fifth Respondents were the first to the third defendants respectively. The first to the fourth Respondents sought for the setting aside, nullification and voiding of the Obaro of Kaaba (Filing of Chieftaincy Vacancy, Declaration of Indigenes of Kabba/Owe Land, Guidelines for the Rotation of Ololu Titles and Other Miscellaneous Provisions) Edict No 12 of 1995 pursuant to which the Appellant was appointed the Obaro of Kaaba. The Edict was promulgated on the 15th of December, 1995 was deemed to have commenced on the same date.

The action leading to this appeal was filed on the 17th of September, 2018. Counsel to the Appellant filed a notice of preliminary objection to challenge the competence of the action on the two main grounds; namely (i) that it was premature as the first to the fourth Respondents failed to exhaust the domestic remedies prescribed under Section 6(1) and (2) of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law of 2006; and (ii) that the action was statute barred under and by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Kwara State (as applicable in Kogi State) and Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Kwara State (as applicable in Kogi State). The High Court of Kogi State heard the preliminary objection on the merits and it delivered a well-considered Ruling thereon. On the first ground of preliminary objection, the High Court stated thus:

"... Let us refer to the law under contention by both parties which is S. 6(1) & (2) of the Chiefs Law, 2006, and it provides:

'6(1) In case of any dispute in the appointment of any Chieftaincy Stool, the Governor shall have power to constitute a panel of inquiry into the dispute.

(2) The Governor-in-Council shall have power to approve the recommendations of the panel of inquiry set up in pursuance of this section.'

... The provisions of Section 6(1) & (2) are very clear and unambiguous, it gives the Governor of the State the power to set up a panel of inquiry into a chieftaincy dispute and also the power to approve the recommendations of such a panel. The provision is an enabling provision couched in this way 'shall have the power to constitute a panel of inquiry." ... such enabling power is only permissive and not mandatory. It is different from a compelling provision such as 'shall constitute a panel of inquiry'. The clear and unambiguous provision is that where there is a dispute regarding a chieftaincy, the Governor may constitute a panel of inquiry, bit is not mandatory on him to set up such a panel. In my firm view, the provision therefore permits the Governor to constitute a panel of inquiry, but he may choose not to set up or constitute one and decide on the dispute in some other way without such a panel.

In the light of the above, have written a letter of 30th of July, 2018 regarding the chieftaincy dispute of the Obaro of Kaaba, it is not mandatory on the 2nd defendant to constitute a panel of inquiry as demanded in the said letter. And having so written, it is immaterial that the first suit was instituted only 6 days after the letter was sent. The fact that the letter was sent and no reply thereto as to whether the Governor will constitute a panel or not. The claimants have acted as required under S. 6 of the Chiefs Law and therefore within their right to come to court to ventilate their grievance."

On the second ground of the preliminary objection, the High Court reproduced the claims of the first to the fourth Respondents and deliberated thus:

> "The contention of the claimants/respondents is that said Law No 12 of 1995 was in abeyance until the 2nd defendant took the step and the processes leading to the appointment of the 1st defendant as the Obaro of Kaaba and are therefore not estopped from challenging it. As stated earlier, in the course of this ruling, the court must interpret any law in its plain or ordinarily meaning if the words in that statute are clear and unambiguous. ...
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> Is the Law No 12 of 1995 in abeyance as contended by the respondents? From the clear provisions of Law No 12 of 1995, the commencement date is stated therein to be 15th December, 1995. It is not stated therein that the law will commence on a future date or on the happening of a future event, nor is it stated therein that some other person will bring it into effect. Try as hard as I could, I cannot see where in the Law it is said to be in abeyance or not in effect until the happening or the installation of a future Obaro. The issue of the Law being in abeyance has no root or foundation in the interpretation of Law No 12 of 1995. ...
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> It is clear from the Law No 12 of 1995 that the commencement date is 15th December, 1995. To say that the Law was in abeyance until appointment of the 1st defendant is to import what is clearly not in the said Law. The issue of the Law being in abeyance has no root or foundation in the interpretation of Law No 12 of 1995. That arguments will therefore be of no moment and is consequently discountenanced by me."

The High Court of Kogi State thereafter considered that facts averred in the statement of claim of the first to the fourth Respondents in order to determine what their exact cause of action was and when the cause of action accrued. The High Court found that the cause of action of the first to the fourth Respondents was founded on the bastardization and fragmentation of the number of Ruling Houses entitled to fill the vacancy

in the Obaro of Kaaba Stool from one Ruling House, the Ilajo Ruling Family, to three Ruling Houses in the Ilajo Ruling Family, contrary to the history, custom and tradition of Kabba/Owe land on the chieftaincy. The High Court found that this bastardization and fragmentation of the number of Ruling Houses occurred with the promulgation of Law No 12 of 1995 and continued thus:

> **'The wrongful act introduced by Law No 12 of 1995 occurred in December 1995 by the introduction of what the claimants called 'alien custom and tradition' which negatively and fundamentally affected the claimants' age-long custom and tradition relating to the ascension to the throne of Obaro of Kaaba. There is therefore the wrongful act of the defendant perpetuated in 1995 for which the then sole ruling house, Ilajo Ruling Family had a cause to complain. Let me emphasize that the declaration of the custom and tradition relating to the ascension to the throne of Obaro of Kaaba came into force on December 15th, 1995. It is not only a Registered Declaration as envisaged by S. 8(1) – (9) of the Chiefs (Appointments, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils in Kogi State) Law 2006, but a Declaration made by law and became operative on 15th December, 1995."**

The High Court concluded that the cause of action of the first to the fourth Respondents accrued in 1995 and that as such the action was statute barred and it upheld the second leg of the preliminary objection and dismissed the action.

The first to the fourth Respondents were dissatisfied with the portion of the Ruling of the High Court of Kogi State that upheld the second ground of the preliminary objection and they caused an appeal to be filed against it. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the portion of the Ruling that dismissed the first ground of the preliminary objection and he caused his Counsel to file a notice of cross-appeal against it. The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and cross appeal on the merits and delivered a considered wherein it allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross appeal.

In allowing the appeal and setting aside the position taken by the High Court of Kogi State on the action of the first to the fourth Respondent being statute barred, the Court of Appeal reasoned thus:

> "From the facts relevant to the determination of whether the cause of action was statute barred or not, it is evident that in the instant case, the cause of action though legislated for by Edict No. 12 of 1995, the referred Edict laid in abeyance until 2018 when the 2nd Respondent activated the same by appointing the 1st Respondent who is not a member of the traditional ruling family as Obaro of Kabba by virtue of the said Edict. This, in my understanding means that although in 1995, Edict No. 12 was promulgated but there was no defined wrong nor defined necessary parties to sue and be sued against for the appointment of Obaro of Kabba moreso since the Edict did not foreclose the appointment of Chief Michael Folorunsho Olobayo who was a member of the Appellants family (royal family) who was on the throne before the promulgation of Edict No. 121995. In other words, the wrong and the parties became defined and definite in 2018. It will be illogical for anyone to have taken an action when no appointment had been made in accordance with the provisions of the said Edict regarding the Obaro of Kabba. Therefore, the Appellants particularly the 1st Appellant who was selected by the Ilajo royal family (Appellants) could not have had a definite or crystallized wrong done against him by the Respondents in 1995. As at 1995, the Appellants particularly the 1st Appellant did not have the combination of facts which could give them the right to sue because although the promulgation of the Edict No. 121995 may have given them the cause of complaint but the Appellants definitely did not have a consequent damage as a result of the Edict until the appointment of the 1st Respondent in 2018. ...
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> Put in another way, I will say as at 1995, every fact which would have been necessary for the Appellants to prove, if traversed in order to support their right to judgment, had not all occurred and so no competent Plaintiff nor Defendant as the Appellants and the Respondents were in existence, for a cause of action to have

accrued to the Appellants against the Respondents as at that 1995, for which they could have effectively prosecuted this action. I hold, the events whereby the Appellants cause of action could be complete to accrue a cause of action to the aggrieved Appellants to begin and maintain an action against the Respondents did not accrue to the Appellants upon the promulgation of the Edict No. 121995 but in 2018 when the 2nd Respondent appointed the 1st Respondent the Obaro of Kabba.

It is worthy of note that the specific wrong complained of by the Appellants is the appointment of the 1st Respondent. Therefore, while it is clear that Edict No.12 of 1995 (Kogi State) was promulgated in 1995, no specific or definite damage or wrong was occasioned against the Appellants. Any alleged wrong against the Appellants by Edict No. 12 1995 was non-factual, speculative and imaginary before the appointment of the 1st Respondent by the 2nd Respondent as the Obaro of Kabba. Hence, the Appellants could not have commenced any action until the appointment of the 1st Respondent in 2018. Consequently, I hold that the argument of the Respondents on this point lacks merit.

I further hold that the cause of action of the Appellants did not accrue in 1995 when Edict No. 12 of 1995 was promulgated but in 2018 when both the cause of complaint and consequent/resultant damage crystallized. Therefore, I agree with the submission of the Appellants that though Edict No. 12 of 1995 gave the Appellants a cause for complaint when it was made in 1995, that complaint remained in abeyance until the consequent damage occurred in 2018 when the provisions of the said Edict were invoked to fill the vacancy of the stool of the Obaro of Kabba. I am of the view that there was no need for an action to challenge the Edict No.12 of 1995 as it relates to the native law and custom of Kabba people in relation to the stool of Obaro of Kabba since as at the time the Edict was promulgated and up till 2018 when the Obaro of Kabba died, the incumbent Obaro of Kabba was from the Ilajo ruling house (the Appellants).

In addition, I want to state that it was only after the demise of the late Obaro of Kabba in 2018 and the need to fill the vacancy so created by his death that the procedure to be adopted in the filling of the said vacancy became of importance. It was at that point that Edict No. 12 of 1995, and its chieftaincy declaration related law as to the ascension to the throne of the Obaro of Kabba, vis a vis the native law and custom of Kabba people in relation to the stool of Obaro of Kabba came into conflict; and so Edict No.12 of 1995 became of moment."

With regards to the cross appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the reasoning of the High Court of Kogi State on purport and intent of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law of 2006 and dismissed the cross appeal. The Court of Appeal stated that:

"In the instant case by the provisions of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law of 2006, a party who is aggrieved by the Act of the Kogi State Chiefs Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils (Kingmakers) as regards the appointment of chiefs is required to make a complaint to the Governor of Kogi State and the Governor shall set up an enquiry to investigate the complaint.

However, it is worthy to note that the law referred to Kogi State Chiefs Law did not state the time limit within which the Governor shall set up the panel of enquiry to investigate the complaint and did not also state the time limit that an aggrieved party must exhaust before approaching the Court. ... From the record of appeal before me, the 1st to 4th Respondents in line with the provisions of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law, 2006 made a complaint to the Governor vide a letter dated 30th July, 2018 ... Also, from the record of appeal before me, there is nothing to show that the panel of enquiry was set up as required by the law

or any reply evincing the intention to set up the panel communicated to the 1st- 4th Cross Respondents.

Now, bearing in mind that the statute of limitation runs in actions instituted against public officers just like in the instant action, it is my firm view that it will lead to absurdity for one to say that the 1st to 4th Cross-Respondents should have waited indefinitely for the Governor to set up the panel of enquiry, over 45 days having elapsed without any response from the Governor. Therefore, I hold that the 1st to 4th Cross-Respondents exhausted all the remedies provided by Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law, 2006 before approaching the Court. I therefore further hold that the action filed by the 1st to 4th Respondents is competent."

This further appeal to this Court by the Appellant is against these findings, reasonings and conclusions of the Court of Appeal on the appeal and cross appeal. I agree with the lead judgment that the learned Counsel to the Appellant has not given this Court any reason to question, depart from or tamper with these meticulous findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeal.

All the hullabaloo generated by this case from the High Court to this Court on the action of the first to the fourth Respondents being statute barred would have been avoided if the Judge who presided over this matter in the High Court of Kogi State, Honorable Justice S. O. Out, and the Counsel to the Appellant had made an effort to read and understand and/or had been honest with their understanding of past decisions of this Court in the cases of **Ikine Vs Edjerode** (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt 745) 446 and **Esuwoye Vs Bosere & Ors** (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt 1546) 256.

The case of **Esuwoye Vs Bosere & Ors** was in respect of the Olofa of Ofa Chieftaincy and the facts and circumstances were the same as those in the present case. This Court, per my Noble Lord, Onnoghen, JSC (as he then

was) deliberated on the question of whether the action was statute barred in circumstances similar to this case thus:

"The facts relevant to the determination of this issue are simple and straight forward and not in dispute. They are as follows:

i. that exhibit 'J', a Kwara State Government Gazette was made by the government in 1970 with retrospective effect from December, 1969.

ii. that exhibit 'J' contains the Chieftaincy Declaration for the Olofa of Offa Stool.

iii. that the said declaration contains the procedure for the selection of Olofa of Offa by the Olugbense and Anilelerin ruling houses.

iv. that at the time the said declaration, exhibit 'J' was made, the late Olofa of Offa was on the throne until 2010 when he died.

v. that the first time the provisions of exhibit 'J' are to be put into operation in filling vacancy in the stool of Olofa of Offa was in 2010 as a result of the death of the said Olofa of Offa.

vi. that following the death of the late Olofa of Offa, the Olugbense and Anilelerin ruling houses were invited by the King Makers, vide exhibit 'K', to present their respective candidates for the filling of the said vacancy in accordance with the provision of the said exhibit 'J'.

vii. that the process so initiated produced the 5th cross respondent/ appellant in the main appeal, from the Anilelerin ruling house and 1st cross appellant from Olugbense ruling house as candidates for the stool.

viii. that at the conclusion of the exercise, the 5th cross respondent/appellant was elected and appointed, etc, Olofa of Offa which resulted in the institution of the main suit at the High Court challenging the emergence of the 5th cross respondent and the counter claim giving rise to this cross appeal.

ix. that the counter claim of the 1st-5th cross respondents challenged the provisions of exhibit 'J' on the ground that it is not consistent with the native law and custom of Offa people relating to the stool of Olofa of Offa.

x. that the trial court held that the counter claim was statute barred as exhibit 'J' had remained unchallenged for over 40 years, which decision was overruled by the lower court resulting in the instant cross appeal.

The issue simply is, when did the cause of action accrue in this case? Is it in 1969/1970 when exhibit 'J' was made or said to take effect or 2010 when the late Olofa of Offa died and the need to fill the vacancy created by his demise arose? While the cross appellants contend that it arose in 1969/1970, the 1st - 5th cross respondents are of the view that their cause of action arose in 2010. Which of them is correct, is the question begging for answer.

...Having regard to the established facts relevant to the issue under consideration and the applicable law as stated earlier in this judgment, can it be said that the lower court was right in holding that the cause of action of the cross respondents herein arose in 2010 following the death of the late Olofa of Offa and invitation to fill the vacancy thereby created, in accordance with the provisions of exhibit 'J'?

I agree with the lower court that the cause of action of the cross respondents did not accrue in 1969/1970 when exhibit 'J' was promulgated but in 2010 when both the cause of complaint and consequent/resultant damage became crystalised. I agree with the submission of learned senior counsel for the 5th cross respondent that though exhibit 'J' gave the cross respondents a cause for complaint when it was made in 1969/1970, that complaint remained in abeyance until the "consequent damage" which occurred in 2010when the provisions of exhibit 'J' were invoked to fill the vacancy in issue. It has to be noted that there was no need for an action to challenge exhibit 'J' as it relates to the native law and custom of Offa people in

relation to the stool of Olofa of Offa as at the time the said exhibit 'J' was made and up till 2010 when the Olofa of Offa died, the incumbent Olofa of Offa was from the Anilelerin ruling house of the 5th cross respondent.

I am of the strong view that it was only after the demise of the late Olofa of Offa in 2010 and the need to fill the vacancy thereby created that the procedure to be adopted in the filling of that vacancy became relevant and thereby, the issue as to whether or not exhibit 'J', which is said to be the Chieftaincy Declaration in relation to the Olofa of Offa, is a true statement of the native law and custom of Offa people in relation to the stool of Olofa of Offa.

It should be noted that the claim of the cross respondents in the counter claim earlier reproduced in this judgment has nothing to do with the authority or power of the then Military Government of Kwara State to make exhibit 'J'. The claim is simply saying that exhibit 'J' should be set aside as same does not represent the correct and true native law and custom of Offa people in relation to the stool of Olofa of Offa. The factual situation making it necessary for the cross respondents to challenge the 6th and 7th respondents as to the existence of Olugbense ruling house in terms of exhibit 'J' arose in 2010, following the death of the Olofa of Offa, though the dispute might have risen as far back as 1970, the application of exhibit "J" only came in 2010, not before that year"

This Court concluded in case that the counterclaim of the cross respondents was not statute barred.

The doctrine of judicial precedent, commonly referred to as the principle of *stare decisis*, is the corner stone of all common law legal systems, and of which Nigeria is one. It is a legal principle by which Judges are obliged to respect the precedent established by prior decisions. The general principle in common law legal systems is that similar cases should be decided so as to give similar and predictable outcomes, and the principle of precedent is the mechanism by which that goal is attained. The words *stare decisis* originate from the phrasing of the principle in the Latin maxim

stare decisis et non quieta movere: "to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed." In a legal context, this is understood to mean that courts should generally abide by precedent and not disturb settled matters. Its meaning is that when a point of law has been once solemnly and necessarily declared by the decision of a competent court, it will no longer be considered open to an examination, or a new ruling, by the same court or tribunal or by those which are bound to follow its adjudications.

In a hierarchical judicial arrangement, it precludes the Judges of subordinate courts from changing what has been determined by a higher court. In other words, they should keep the scale of justice even and steady and not liable to waver with every Judge's opinion – **Adesokan Vs Adetunji** (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt 345) 540, **Okeke Vs Okoli** (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 641, **Osakue Vs Federal College of Education, Asaba** (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1201) 1. The doctrine postulates that where the facts in a subsequent case are similar or close as facts in an earlier case that had been decided upon, judicial pronouncements in the earlier case are subsequently utilized to govern and determine the decision in the subsequent case – **Nwangwu Vs Ukachukwu** (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 662) 674.

The reasons which underlie this rule were stated by Chancellor Kent, in a much-quoted passage from his Commentaries, as follows:

> **"A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the community has a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would, therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety**

and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law."

Nigeria operates a hierarchical judicial arrangement and the Supreme Court is the highest court in that arrangement. The operation of the doctrine of judicial precedent prescribes that all previous decisions and judgments of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts in the judicial arrangement including the Supreme Court itself, and that the Supreme Court can only depart from its earlier decisions and judgments in certain exceptional circumstances – **Atolagbe Vs Awuni** (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt 522) 536, **Okulate Vs Awosanya** (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt 646) 530 and **Odugbo Vs Abu** (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt 732) 45. The concept of *stare decisis* is the foundation upon which the consistency of the Nigerian judicial system is based – **Dalhatu Vs Turaki** (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 310. Adherence to precedent is one of the strongest principles of judicial policy which provides for an orderly and reliable development of legal rules and it does not involve an exercise of judicial discretion; it is mandatory – **Amaechi Vs Independent National Electoral Commission** (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt 1080) 227 and **Dingyadi Vs Independent National Electoral Commission** (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 347.

The records of Court shows that the decisions of this Court in the cases of **Ikine Vs Edjerode** *supra* and **Esuwoye Vs Bosere & Ors** *supra* were cited and brought to the attention of the High Court of Kogi State, but they were ignored and discountenanced by the Court for very flimsy reasons. This was a clear case of judicial impertinence and judicial rascality. This

failure of the High Court of Kogi State to pay true fidelity to the doctrine of judicial precedent, and most likely with encouragement of the learned Counsel to the Appellant for selfish and self-centred reasons, has led to a waste of the seven years period that this case has spent travelling from the High Court to this Court on preliminary matters. It is hoped that this incident is an isolated issue, as this Court might be compelled to recommend sanctions against such intransigence in future.

This appeal is completely devoid of any merit and I too hereby dismiss same. I affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Abuja Judicial Division, delivered on the 31st of March, 2021 in Appeal No CA/A/1116/2019. I abide the consequential orders in lead judgment.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU
JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

Dayo Akinlaja, SAN, with Kabiru Fadile and Jeremiah Akinlaja — for the Appellant

R. A. Lawal-Rabana, SAN, with John Fakado and Collins Ojay — for 1st to 4th Respondents

Mercy M. Tseja, Senior Legal Officer, MoJ Kogi — for 5th & 6th Respondents